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ABSTRACT
In recent years, deep learning-based video manipulation methods
have become widely accessible to masses. With little to no effort,
people can easily learn how to generate deepfake videos with only
a few victims or target images. This creates a significant social
problem for everyone whose photos are publicly available on the
Internet, especially on social media websites. Several deep learning-
based detection methods have been developed to identify these
deepfakes. However, these methods lack generalizability, because
they perform well only for a specific type of deepfake method.
Therefore, those methods are not transferable to detect other deep-
fake methods. Also, they do not take advantage of the temporal
information of the video. In this paper, we addressed these limita-
tions. We developed a Convolutional LSTM based Residual Network
(CLRNet), which takes a sequence of consecutive images as an input
from a video to learn the temporal information that helps in de-
tecting unnatural looking artifacts that are present between frames
of deepfake videos. We also propose a transfer learning-based ap-
proach to generalize different deepfake methods. Through rigorous
experimentations using the FaceForensics++ dataset, we showed
that our method outperforms five of the previously proposed state-
of-the-art deepfake detection methods by better generalizing at
detecting different deepfake methods using the same model.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning-based methods for synthetic image generation have
sprouted tremendously in the last few years. These new methods
can generate photorealistic images that can easily deceive average
humans [15, 24, 25, 35, 40, 41]. Due to their ability, these methods
have many applications in computer vision or graphics disciplines,
such as human face generation [24] and photorealistic scenery gen-
eration [31]. However, there is also a dark side to all of this innova-
tion. Many people with malicious intentions have used these meth-
ods to generate fake videos of celebrities and masses [11, 13, 14, 23],
for which numerous approaches exist [15, 25, 40, 41]. This has
started causing major social issues: a recent study claimed that
96% of the deepfakes originate from porn videos [30]. They come
under the same umbrella of so-called Deepfakes. Recently, the re-
search community has released numerous deepfake datasets to
assist other researchers in developing detection mechanisms for
these deepfakes. The most pioneering work is the FaceForensics++
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dataset [35] developed in part by Google. Originally, the FaceForen-
sics++ [35] dataset contained Pristine (1,000), Deepfakes (1,000),
FaceSwap (1,000), Face2Face (1,000), and Neural Texture (1,000)
videos. Later, Google contributed by supplementing real (363) and
fake (3,000) videos. This year, Facebook launched a deepfake de-
tection challenge with prize money of one million U.S. dollars to
accelerate research in this field [6]. Lately, several deepfake detec-
tion methods with high zero-shot test accuracy on specific training
deepfake datasets have emerged [3, 10, 21, 22, 29, 39]. However,
they would have poor detection accuracy on new deepfake meth-
ods that were not present in the training set. This was our primary
motivation to develop a generic and universal deepfake video de-
tector, since it would be impractical to produce datasets for every
new deepfake generation method. Therefore, we leverage massive
deepfake datasets, such as FaceForensics++ [35], that are already
available and employ transfer learning to detect other deepfake
methods as well as newly generated ones.
Studies on the development of a generic deepfake detector have
seen limited research activity [10]. Therefore, we aim to address
these problems by developing a model that first trains on one
deepfake method from the massive deepfake dataset of FaceForen-
sics++ [35] and then uses a few-shot transfer learning method to
learn about other deepfake methods. The number of sample videos
required for few-shot learning is minimal, rendering the choice
more practical. Our method differs from previous works in that we
explored different transfer learning strategies and compared their
results through rigorous experimentations on multiple datasets.
We noticed that most of the deepfake detection methods [10, 35]
randomly extract frames (images) from videos for training and
testing, hence a single frame-based detection method. However,
after carefully observing numerous deepfake videos, we were sur-
prised to discover tiny artifacts between consecutive frames within
the deepfake videos through which we can identify these videos,
as shown in Fig. 1. Therefore, we concluded that the temporal
information between consecutive video frames is crucial for deep-
fake detection [36]. To incorporate the temporal aspect, we used
a Convolutional LSTM, since it has shown to be useful for such
tasks [43]. Therefore, we propose CLRNet, a Convolutional LSTM
based Residual Network for Deep Fake Video Detection using Trans-
fer Learning.
The main contributions are summarized as follows:
• CLRNet: We propose a novel architecture based on Convo-
lutional LSTM and Residual Network for deepfake detection
using a sequence of consecutive frames from a video.
• Generalizability: We provided a more generalized method
than previous state-of-the-art deepfake detection approaches
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Figure 1: Difference between two consecutive frames of a
deepfake video. (a) and (b) are the nth and (n + 1)th frames,
respectively. For pristine videos, these frames are nearly the
same, but for deepfake videos, there are inconsistencies. The
difference between the nth and (n + 1)th frames highlights
(red) those inconsistencies in (c). There is a small difference
between real video frames, but the difference between fake
video frames is more significant, as shown in (c).
with high accuracy and demonstrated it through rigorous
experimentations.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our work spans across different fields, such as deepfake detection,
model generalization, and transfer learning. Therefore, we will
briefly cover the related works in this section.
2.1 Deepfake Detection
The detection of abnormal eye blinking [26] has shown to be effec-
tive for the identification of inconsistencies in manipulated videos
or images. Furthermore, image splice detection methods [4, 20, 37]
aim to exploit the deviation resulting from splicing near the bound-
aries of manipulated regions in an image. Although inconsistencies
in images generated from existing deepfake generation methods
can be detected, new and more advanced generation methods are re-
searched and developed every year. On the other hand, model-based
methods, such as the measurement of features from demosaicing
artifacts [16], lens aberrations [45], and JPEG artifacts resulting
from the choice of different image processing methods [2], have
traditionally been used to identify image manipulations. Neverthe-
less, they have shown to be unreliable when detecting machine-
generated fake images, such as Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) and Variational Autoencoders (VAEs), because the entire
set of images are created from scratch. Deep learning-based ap-
proaches in a supervised environment have shown high detection
accuracy. Specifically, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) based
approaches concentrated on automatically learning hierarchical
representations from the RGB color images input [27, 33] or uti-
lizing manipulation detection features [5], and using hand-crafted
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Figure 2: Convolutional LSTM cell: Visual representation of
the Convolutional LSTM cell. The main structure is simi-
lar to that of an LSTM, but some additional components are
present to incorporate the convolutional part. Here,Xt is the
input, Ct is the cell output, and Ht is the hidden state. The
gates are represented by it , ft , and ot .
features [9]. Tariq et al. [38, 39] introduced ShallowNet, a fast learn-
ing and effective CNN-based network for detecting GAN-generated
images with high accuracy even at low resolution (64×64). Fur-
thermore, Zhou et al. [47] applied a two-stream Faster R-CNN net-
work, which can capture high and low-level image details. Rössler
et al. [34, 35] presented a significantly improved performance on
compressed images, which is essential for detecting deepfakes on
social networking sites such as Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter.
Most of the aforementioned approaches concentrate on detecting
facial manipulations in a single video frame. However, as shown
in Fig. 1, it is crucial to analyze the temporal information between
consecutive frames in deepfake videos. In our approach, we use
multiple consecutive frames to utilize this temporal information
for an improved detection of deepfakes.
2.2 Detection with Consecutive Video Frames
Sabir et al. [36] proposed a detection method that utilizes both the
CNN and Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to capture the temporal
information presented in 5 consecutive deepfake video frames. Also,
Güera et al. [18] adopted a similar approach, extracting the features
from up to 80 consecutive frames using CNN layers and feeding
them to RNN layers to build a temporal information-aware deepfake
detection model. Both methods [18, 36] extract features from CNN
and pass it to RNN layers. At the same time, we build our CLRNet
model using Convolutional LSTM cells, which can capture the
spatio-temporal information directly from an input image sequence.
However, most of these approaches yielded worse results when
evaluated on datasets containing videos from a different deepfake
generation method. Thus, we explored transfer learning for our
CLRNet model to address this challenge.
2.3 Generalization via Transfer Learning
A variety of deepfake video generation techniques are constantly be-
ing developed and more sophisticated deep fake videos will arise in
the future. However, collecting and producing a significant amount
of new deepfake samples would be impractical. To cope with such
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Figure 3: CLRNet Architecture: High-level architectural dia-
gram of our Convolutional LSTM based Residual Network
(CLRNet) model. The input to the model is a sequence of
consecutive images and the output is a classification result,
real or fake.We used Keras temrs to denote the layer names.
situations, few-shot transfer learning (TL) is the key to the detec-
tion of deepfakes created by different methods. That is, what has
been learned in one domain (e.g., FaceSwap) can be used to enhance
the generalizability in another domain (e.g., Face2Face). Cozzolino
et al. [10] have experimented the generalization of a single detec-
tion method for multiple target domains. In this work, we compare
our approach against ForensicsTransfer [10] to demonstrate the
enhanced generalizability and transferability.
3 OUR APPROACH
A frame-by-frame analysis of deepfake videos reveals the inconsis-
tencies between consecutive frames in deepfake videos, which are
absent in pristine videos. These inconsistencies include 1) a sudden
change in brightness and contrast on a small region of the face,
and 2) the size of some facial parts such as eyes, lips, and eyebrows
changes between frames. These are minor inconsistencies that can
be detected with a thorough examination. Figure 1 shows an ex-
ample of such artifact from two consecutive frames of a deepfake
video along with their sudden differences marked in red. These
inconsistencies render the video somewhat unnatural. Motivated
by this finding and observation, we developed a new deepfake de-
tection method, the Convolutional LSTM Residual Network, that
can account for these inconsistencies for the identification of real
and fake videos.
3.1 Convolutional LSTM Cell
Shi et al. [43] stated that the main problem with handling spatio-
temporal data in FC-LSTM [17] is the use of full connections dur-
ing input-to-state and state-to-state transitions, and no spatial in-
formation is encoded. In contrast, Convolutional LSTM (ConvL-
STM) overcomes this problem by introducing 3D tensors whose last
two dimensions are spatial (rows and columns) for all the inputs
(X1, . . . ,Xt ), outputs (C1, . . . ,Ct ), hidden states (H1, . . . ,Ht ), and
gates (it , ft ,ot ). In this paper, we follow the formulation of ConvL-
STM by Shi et al. [43]. The Hadamard product and the Convolution
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Figure 4: CL Block: Visual representation of the internal
structure of the Convolutional LSTM block (CL Block).
There are two ConvLSTM2D layers, each followed by
dropout, BatchNorm, and ReLU. Afterward, we directly
added the last ConvLSTM2D layer to a ConvLSTM2D with a
BatchNorm layer from the shortcut connection to get a1. Fi-
nally, a2 results from BatchNorm followed by ReLU applied
to the output of the addition operator. The input a1 and a2
are identical for the first CL Block, but different afterward.
operator are denoted by ‘◦’ and ‘∗’, respectively.
it = σ
(
Wxi ∗ Xt +Whi ∗ Ht−1 +Wci ◦Ct−1 + bi
)
ft = σ
(
Wxf ∗ Xt +Whf ∗ Ht−1 +Wcf ◦Ct−1 + bf
)
Ct = ft ◦Ct−1 + it ◦ tanh
(
Wxc ∗ Xt +Whc ∗ Ht−1 + bc
)
ot = σ
(
Wxo ∗ Xt +Who ∗ Ht−1 +Wco ◦Ct + bo
)
Ht = ot ◦ tanh (Ct )
(1)
Furthermore, a visual representation of our ConvLSTM cell, based
on Xavier [42] and implementation of Keras [8], is shown in Fig. 2.
3.2 Convolutional LSTM Residual Network
Sabir et al. [36] showed that a CNN based backbone encoding net-
work, such as ResNet or DenseNet, connected to an RNN based
network achieves high accuracy for deepfake detection tasks. They
also find a sequence of images for an improved performance com-
pared to using a single frame input. Furthermore, to avoid the
vanishing gradient problem, we added residuals in our network.
Based on previous research [28, 29, 36, 44] and our analysis of incon-
sistencies and/or artifacts in consecutive frames, we developed our
Convolutional LSTM based Residual Network (CLRNet). Figure 3
shows a visual representation of the architecture for our CLRNet
model. The input elements of our model are 3D tensors preserving
the entire spatial information for consecutive frames. Therefore, we
used ConvLSTM (CL) cells instead of Convolution cells,as shown
in Fig. 4 and 5. Shi et al. [43] state that stacking ConvLSTM in this
way provides a strong representational power to the model. We
developed the core architecture of our CLRNet using two types of
building blocks (i.e., CL block and ID block). Figures 4 and 5 provide
a pictorial representation of the CL and ID blocks. These blocks
can be related to the Convolution and Identity building blocks from
ResNet [19], respectively. The building blocks in our CLRNet model
have two outputs (i.e., a1 and a2), as shown in Fig. 4 and 5. In both
blocks, a1 is the output following the addition step, whereas a2 is
the output of the addition step followed by the batch normalization
and ReLU layers. The output a1 and a2 serve as inputs for the next
block. The CL block contains a ConvLSTM cell followed by a batch
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Figure 5: ID Block: Visual representation of the internal
structure of the Identity block (ID Block). Similar to the CL
Block, there are two ConvLSTM2D layers, each followed by
dropout, BatchNorm, and ReLU. Afterward, we add the last
ConvLSTM2D layer to the inputa1 from the shortcut connec-
tion to get output a1. Finally, a2 is the result of BatchNorm
and ReLU applied to the output of the addition operator.
normalization layer on the shortcut path, whereas in the ID block,
the shortcut path directly connects the input a1 to the addition
layer.
3.3 Transfer Learning Strategies
For transfer learning, we evaluated the following three strategies:
1) Single-source to Single-target: we train our model with one large
deepfake dataset and then apply transfer learning to one target
deepfake dataset (e.g., the model is first trained on the DF dataset
and then transfer learned to FS), 2) Multi-source to Single-target:
we train our model on multiple sources and apply transfer learning
to a single target domain, and 3) Single-source to Multi-target: we
train our model on a single source domain and then use a small
volume of multiple target domains to apply transfer learning. We
will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy in
Section 4.
3.4 Implementation Details
3.4.1 Dataset description. To compare our method with different
baselines, we used DeepFake (DF), FaceSwap (FS), Face2Face (FS),
NeuralTextures(NT), and DeepFakeDetection (DFD) datasets in [35].
Table 1 describes all the datasets used for this paper. Each class
inside the FaceForensics++ [35] dataset, except DFD, contains 1,000
videos. We used the first 750 videos out of 1,000 for training, the
next 125 for validation, and the remaining of the 125 for testing. For
DFD, we selected only 300 videos (250 for training, 25 for validation,
and 25 for testing).
3.4.2 Preprocessing. From each real and fake video, we extracted
16 samples such that each sample contains five consecutive frames.
We used multi-task CNN (MTCNN) [46] to detect the face landmark
information inside the extracted frame. Afterward, we used this
landmark information to crop the face from the image and aligned
it to the center. Lastly, we resized all the frames to a 240 × 240
resolution.
3.4.3 Data Augmentation. We also applied data augmentation tech-
niques to diversify the training data. We varied the following con-
ditions: 1) Brightness (-30% to 30%), 2) Channel shift (-50 to 50),
Table 1: Dataset details: There are 1,000 videos for Pristine,
DeepFake, FaceSwap, Face2Face, and Neural Textures, re-
spectively: we used 750 real and 750 fake videos for training,
125 real and 125 fake videos for validation as well as for test-
ing. There are 3,363 videos (363 real, 3,000 fake) in the Deep-
FakeDetection dataset: we used 250 real and 250 fake videos
for training, 25 real and 25 fake for validation, as well as for
testing. For transfer learning, we used 10 real and 10 fake
videos.
Datasets TotalVideos
Base
Training
videos
Transfer
Learning
videos
Samples
per
video
Pristine (Real) 1,000 750 10 16
DeepFake (DF) 1,000 750 10 16
FaceSwap (FS) 1,000 750 10 16
Face2Face (F2F) 1,000 750 10 16
NeuralTextures (NT) 1,000 750 10 16
DeepFakeDetection (DFD) 3,363 250 10 16
3) Zoom (-20% to 20%), 4) Rotation (-30◦ degrees to 30◦), and 5)
Horizontal flip (50% probability).
3.4.4 Training. The idea behind our method is to train on one
of the widely available deepfake datasets and then use transfer
learning to train for the other datasets with a small amount of
samples. We trained our model by taking 16 samples from each of
the 750 real (Pristine) and 750 fake (DF or FS or F2F or NT) videos.
3.4.5 Transfer Learning Configuration. Once the training is com-
plete for the base model, we performed transfer learning to other
datasets by using a small subset of the target dataset (10 videos).
For our CLRNet model, we freezed the first 120 layers and applied
transfer learning to the model with an equal number of videos from
the source and target datasets, that is, 10 videos per dataset.
3.4.6 Machine Configuration. We used Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4114
CPU @ 2.20GHz with 256.0GB RAM and NVIDIA GeForce Titan
RTX. We used TensorFlow v1.13.0 [1] with Keras Library [8] on
Python v3.7.5 for the implementation of our CLRNet model.
3.4.7 Evaluation Metrics. We used Precision, Recall, and F1-Score
for the evaluation. Due to space limitations, we are reporting only
the F1-Scores in Table 2 and 3. ShallowNet, Xception, FF++ [35],
and FT uses a single frame as input for training and testing sets,
whereas Sabir et al. [36] and our CLRNet uses five consecutive
frames as input. We kept the same number of real and fake images
in the training, validation, and test sets to minimize the influence
of data imbalance during evaluation.
3.5 Baseline Methods
We compared CLRNet with several state-of-the-art methods and
tried our best to implement them according to their specifications.
The following is a description of these methods.
3.5.1 Xception. The Xception Network [7] is considered as the
state-of-the-art for image classification task. We used the Keras [8]
implementation of Xception, which is pre-trained on the ImageNet
dataset [12].
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Figure 6: Training vs Validation Loss of CLRNet: Training
and validation losses of CLRNet on the DeepFake (DF),
FaceSwap(FS), Face2Face (F2F), NeuralTextures (NT), and
DeepFakeDetection (DFD) datasets. The loss progression for
both training and validation is descending very similarly,
which shows that our model is learning accurately and is
not overfitting to the training data.
3.5.2 ShallowNet. Tariq et al. [39] showed that ShallowNet [38]
achieves high accuracy in detecting computer-generated images.
We developed ShallowNet using Python v3.6.8 using TensorFlow
v1.14.0 [1] and used the Keras v2.2.4 [8].
3.5.3 FaceForensics++ (FF++). Rössler et al. [35] used a modified
version of the Xception Network to detect DeepFake, FaceSwap,
Face2Face, and NeuralTextures. We are directly using results from
FaceForensics++ [35], since they used the same dataset.
3.5.4 DenseNet with Bidirectional RNN.. Sabir et al. [36] usedDenseNet
with a bidirectional RNN to achieve high accuracy on DeepFake,
FaceSwap, and Face2Face datasets. Similar to our CLRNet, this work
also uses five consecutive frames for the training and testing of the
model. We are directly using the results of Sabir et al. [36], since
they used the same dataset.
3.5.5 Forensics Transfer (FT).. Cozzolino et al. [10] developed a
weakly supervised method for domain adaptation using an autoen-
coder based approach. They divide the latent space into real and
fake parts to achieve higher detection accuracy on the Face2Face
and FaceSwap datasets. For the implementation of ForensicTransfer
autoencoder [10], we used PyTorch v1.1.0 [32] on Python v3.6.8.
4 RESULTS
We have performed extensive experiments to evaluate and compare
the performances of CLRNet and baseline methods. Only the most
important experiments and their findings are discussed in this
paper. The following sections will discuss the results from different
experiments in detail.
4.1 Learning Capability of CLRNet
Figure 6 presents the training and validation losses of CLRNet on
different datasets (DF, FS, F2F, NT, and DFD). We can observe that
the training and validation lossess gradually descend in a similar
fashion, which shows that our CLRNet model is not overfitting to
the training dataset and is learning distinguishable features between
real and fake images from the training set. As shown in Fig. 6, there
are slight fluctuations in the validation loss of DFD, but it is not the
case for other datasets. We believe that this is due to the smaller
size of the dataset used for DFD training (250 videos) as compared
to other datasets (750 videos), as shown in Table 1. Another cause
is the dynamic environment in DFD videos, making it harder for
the model to learn. However, our CLRNet model was able to learn
from the DFD dataset, even with a smaller data size, and achieved
a 96.00% F1-score, as shown in Table 2.
4.2 Performance on Base Dataset
We trained our CLRNet and other baseline models on a base train-
ing dataset (DF or FS), as shown in Table 2. Then we compared the
performance of the trained model on a test set from the base dataset
and also evaluated the zero-shot performance from the test set of
other datasets. The baseline methods (ShallowNet, Xception, and
FT) and CLRNet are trained and evaluated on the set of images from
the datasets. However, the results of FF++ [35] and Sabir et al. [36]
are directly taken from their work. Table 2 reports all the results. As
we can observe from Table 2, when trained on the DeepFake base
dataset, FT (99.35%) outperforms CLRNet (99.02%) by a slight mar-
gin. The performances of our vanilla implementation of Xception
(86.00%) and ShallowNet (56.65%) do not bear good results. However,
the modified versions of Xception from FF++ (96.36%) and DenseNet
of Sabir et al. (96.90%) perform better than ShallowNet (56.65%) and
the vanilla Xception (86.00%). The zero-shot performance is rela-
tively low (below 85%) for all methods: FT performed the best on
F2F (74.12%) and NT (83.54%), and CLRNet performed the best on
DFD (60.38%). When trained with the FaceSwap (FS) base dataset,
CLRNet (FS: 98.05%) is the best performer as compared to the best
baseline method FT (FS: 96.17%), as shown in Table 2. Similar to the
DF base dataset, Xception (FS: 85.37%), FF++ (FS: 90.29%), and Sabir
el al. (FS: 94.35%) showed decent performance, and ShallowNet
showed the worst performance (FS: 52.75%). We also evaluated our
CLRNet method on NeuralTextures (NT) and DeepFakeDetection
(DFD) base datasets. As shown in Table 2, CLRNet achieves a very
high F1-score for both datasets (NT: 99.50%, DFD: 96.00%). From
Table 2, we can observe that there is no best method in terms of
the zero-shot performance. Therefore, we explore transfer learning
in the next experiments.
4.3 Transfer Learning with Source and Target
In our preliminary experiments, we observed that when the model
is trained with only the target dataset for transfer learning, its
performance on the source dataset drops (as low as 50%), which
is not ideal for building a generic deepfake detector. Therefore,
we combine a small volume of the source (10 videos) and target
(10 videos) datasets for transfer learning, so that the model can
remember the features of the source dataset as well. Figure 7 shows
the training accuracy (source + target), validation accuracy on the
source dataset (FS), and validation accuracy on the target dataset
(DF or F2F or NT). We can observe from Fig. 7 that the validation
accuracy of the source dataset (FS) slightly drops (1~2%), and the
validation accuracy on the target dataset (DF or F2F or NT) increases
over time (reaches up to 90%). This technique allows CLRNet to
achieve high performance on transfer learning for both the source
and target datasets. In the next section, we will discuss the results
of transfer learning.
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(a) Training (Source + Target): We used ten
videos from source and ten from the target
dataset. CLRNet shows high learning capabil-
ity, even with such small amount of data.
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(b) Validation (Source): We achieved high ac-
curacy on the source dataset by providing ten
videos from the source dataset during trans-
fer learning.
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(c) Validation (Target): We also achieved rela-
tively high accuracy on the target dataset by
using only ten videos for the target dataset
with CLRNet.
Figure 7: Transfer Learning Accuracy of CLRNet: Comparison of (a) transfer learning (TL) training accuracy with (b) the val-
idation accuracy of the source and (c) the validation accuracy of the target. The arrow ‘→’ represents the TL from a source
dataset to a target dataset.
4.4 Transfer Learning Performance
For transfer learning, we used only CLRNet and the best perform-
ing baseline model on the base dataset, namely FT. Cozzolino et
al. [10] performed only the Face2Face (source) to FaceSwap (target)
experiment for the FF++ dataset [35]. We performed extensive ex-
periments with FT and compared it with our CLRNet model. We
performed three different types of experiments, each consisting of
multiple sub-experiments, for the transfer learning (TL) task. The
following sections provide the details of these experiments and the
performance evaluation of CLRNet and FT.
4.4.1 Exp 1. Single–source to Single–target. In this experiment, we
used one source dataset (either FS, F2F, NT, DFD or DF) and one
target dataset (either FS, F2F, NT, DFD or DF) for transfer learning
and compared the performance of FT and CLRNet. Due to space
limitations, we partially report this experiment in Table 3. In exper-
iment 1, we set DeepFake (DF) as the source and FaceSwap (FS) as
the target. The CLRNet accuracy increases from 50.00% to 83.08%
for the target (FS) and drops from 99.02% to 90.95% for source (DF),
as shown in Table 2 and 3. In contrast, FT accuracy drops from
50.00% (FS) and 99.35% (DF) to 47.72% (FS) and 62.59% (DF), respec-
tively, as shown in Table 2 and 3. Similarly, when Face2Face (F2F)
is the target, the CLRNet accuracy increases from 53.73% to 88.35%
for the target, whereas the FT accuracy increases only by 5% from
74.12% to 79.31%. This low performance demonstrates the limitation
of FT regarding generalization. In experiment 2, we set FaceSwap
(FS) as the source, and the performance for the target datasets (DF
and F2F) are even better than in experiment 1, in favor of CLR-
Net. When DeepFake (DF) is the target, CLRNet (FS: 96.33%, DF:
92.47%) outperforms FT (FS: 44.93%, DF:76.94%) by 50% for FS and
16% for DF, respectively. Also, when Face2Face (F2F) is the target,
CLRNet (FS: 93.93%, F2F: 87.48%) outperforms FT (FS: 55.74%, F2F:
53.73%), as shown in Table 3. We also experimented with CLRNet
by setting the target as NeuralTextures (NT) or DeepFakeDetection
(DFD). After transfer learning, the performance on NT increases
from 98.05% to 98.12% for the source (FS) and from 53.33% to 95.50%
for the target (NT), as shown in Table 2 and 3. Finally, for DFD, we
observed a similar trend and achieved an increase from 49.13% to
88.88%.
Based on our experiment, we observed that the accuracy of CLR-
Net always increases for the target as compared to its zero-shot
performance with a slight decrease or sometimes an increase in
the source accuracy, as shown in Table 2 and 3. On the other hand,
the performance of FT is very unstable and generally worse than
the single dataset performance, which shows significant limita-
tion of FT; CLRNet overcomes this limitation and achieves better
performance.
4.4.2 Exp 2. Multi–source to Single–target. In this experiment, we
first trained the model with two different source datasets and then
performed transfer learning to a new target dataset. In Table 3, we
report the best performing model of this experiment for both FT
and CLRNet, namely FS+DF (source) and F2F (target). The accuracy
of CLRNet (FS: 94.37%, DF: 92.15%) on the source is significantly
higher compared to that of FT (FS: 45.17%, DF: 64.08%). Similarly,
CLRNet(F2F: 86.22%) outperforms FT (F2F: 55.98%) on the target
dataset, as shown in Table 3. CLRNet also exceeds the performance
of FT in terms of zero-shot learning on NT (CLRNet: 79.75%, FT:
62.09%) and DFD (CLRNet: 63.12%, FT: 51.38%). This experiment also
validates the superiority of CLRNet over FT at deepfake detection
generalization.
4.4.3 Exp. 3. Single–source to Multi–target. In this experiment, we
test the generalizability of our CLRNet model, that is, its perfor-
mance to detect multiple deepfake types at once with only a small
amount of data. For this experiment, we first trained our CLRNet
model on a source dataset (FS) and then performed three types
of experiments. In experiment 1, we set the target as DF+F2F and
evaluated the accuracy of the model after transfer learning. From
Table 3, we can observe the performance for the source (FS: 94.55%)
and the target (DF: 91.77%, F2F:87.75%). In experiment 2, we set the
target as DF+F2F+NT. From Table 3, we can see the accuracy for
the source (FS: 94.35%) and the target (DF: 90.67%, F2F:85.78%, NT:
91.47%). In this experiment, we set the target as DF+F2F+NT+DFD.
In Table 3, we can see the accuracy for the source (FS: 93.70%)
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Table 2: The base dataset and zero-shot performance: This ta-
ble shows the performance comparison of our CLRNet with
five different baseline models. First, we trained the models
on a base dataset. Afterward, we tested all models on the
base dataset (highlighted in gray) and on other datasets as
well (zero-shot). Our CLRNet has the highest performance
for all base datasets except one. However, for zero-shot per-
formance, CLRNet performed the best on FS and FT as well
as on DF and F2F. ‘‡’ represents our implementation of the
method.
Method BaseDataset
DF FS F2F NT DFD
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
ShallowNet‡
DF
56.65 50.32 54.15 35.13 41.23
Xception 86.00 49.78 57.26 61.49 68.10
FF++ [35] 96.36 - - - -
Sabir et al. [36] 96.90 - - - -
FT‡ 99.35 50.00 74.12 83.54 48.45
CLRNet (Ours) 99.02 50.00 53.73 69.75 60.38
ShallowNet‡
FS
47.09 52.75 47.50 46.96 49.58
Xception 49.49 85.37 56.61 52.05 48.08
FF++ [35] - 90.29 - - -
Sabir et al. [36] - 94.35 - - -
FT‡ 48.86 96.17 54.39 47.45 36.66
CLRNet (Ours) 48.53 98.05 50.15 53.33 49.13
FF++ [35] NT - - - 80.67 -CLRNet (Ours) 50.12 49.93 49.80 99.50 50.00
CLRNet (Ours) DFD 65.08 51.92 60.32 63.10 96.00
and the target (DF: 91.23%, F2F:87.50%, NT: 91.30%, DFD: 87.13%).
Based on these experiments, we concluded: 1) that by increasing
the number of target datasets, the source dataset accuracy slightly
decreases (1~2%), and that 2) CLRNet generalizes well on different
deepfake datasets, since its performance is better than the zero-shot
performance on the same dataset in all of our experiments.
5 CONCLUSION
We introduced CLRNet, which is successfully applied to detect a va-
riety of deepfake videos. Instead of using a single frame, our model
uses a sequence of consecutive frames from the video as an input,
which helps our CLRNet model to capture and incorporate the tem-
poral information and detect artifacts present between consecutive
frames. Through more than 5 different experiments, we have shown
the superiority of our CLRNet model over the previous baselines
and state-of-the-art methods. To conclude, we addressed the short-
comings of the previous state-of-the-art methods by proposing
a more generalizable model with a better detection performance.
From this work, we hope that our research is a stepping stone to-
ward developing more generalized deepfake detectors and future
work will continue to challenge and improve existing deepfake
detection methods to more generalizable and universal approaches.
Table 3: Transfer Learning Performance: This table shows
the performance comparison of our CLRNet model and the
best baselinemethod from the previous experiment, namely
FT. In this experiment, wefirst trained themodel on a source
dataset and then used a small target dataset (highlighted in
gray) consisting of 10 videos to perform transfer learning.
Afterward, we performed testing on all datasets. We per-
formed ten experiments belonging to 3 different types: 1)
Single-source to single-target, 2) Multi-source to single tar-
get, and 3) Single-source to Multi-target. Our CLRNet model
performed the best in all scenarios. ‘‡’ represents our imple-
mentation of the method.
Method Source Target DF FS F2F NT DFD(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Single–source to Single–target
FT‡
DF
FS 62.59 47.72 61.34 68.51 51.38CLRNet 90.95 83.08 48.68 65.00 53.87
FT‡ F2F 83.70 54.92 79.31 82.24 54.92CLRNet 97.18 49.28 88.35 78.05 68.13
FT‡
FS
DF 76.94 44.93 66.42 70.53 49.78CLRNet 92.47 96.33 65.58 75.80 59.13
FT‡ F2F 56.06 55.74 53.73 55.38 47.63CLRNet 79.87 93.93 87.48 78.00 52.50
FT‡ NT - - - - -CLRNet 51.82 98.12 50.90 95.50 49.13
FT‡ DFD - - - - -CLRNet 70.97 96.15 51.85 77.02 88.88
Multi–source to Single–target
FT‡ FS+DF F2F 64.08 45.17 55.98 62.09 51.38CLRNet 92.15 94.37 86.22 79.75 63.12
Single–source to Multi–target
CLRNet
(best) FS
DF+F2F 91.77 94.55 87.75 85.12 69.13
DF+F2F 94.35 69.50
+NT 90.67 85.78 91.47
DF+F2F 93.70
+NT+DFD 91.23 87.50 91.30 87.13
REFERENCES
[1] Martín Abadi, Paul Barham, Jianmin Chen, Zhifeng Chen, Andy Davis, Jeffrey
Dean, Matthieu Devin, Sanjay Ghemawat, Geoffrey Irving, Michael Isard, et al.
2016. Tensorflow: A system for large-scale machine learning. In 12th {USENIX}
Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation ({OSDI} 16). 265–
283.
[2] Shruti Agarwal and Hany Farid. 2017. Photo forensics from JPEG dimples. In
2017 IEEE Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS). IEEE, 1–6.
[3] Shruti Agarwal, Hany Farid, Yuming Gu, Mingming He, Koki Nagano, and Hao
Li. 2019. Protecting World Leaders Against Deep Fakes. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops. 38–45.
[4] Jawadul H Bappy, Amit K Roy-Chowdhury, Jason Bunk, Lakshmanan Nataraj,
and BS Manjunath. 2017. Exploiting spatial structure for localizing manipulated
image regions. In Proceedings of the IEEE international conference on computer
vision. 4970–4979.
[5] Belhassen Bayar and Matthew C Stamm. 2016. A deep learning approach to
universal image manipulation detection using a new convolutional layer. In
Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia
Security. ACM, 5–10.
[6] Deepfake Detection Challenge. 2019. Deepfake Detection Challenge. https:
//www.kaggle.com/c/deepfake-detection-challenge. Accessed: 2020-02-12.
[7] François Chollet. 2017. Xception: Deep learning with depthwise separable con-
volutions. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition. 1251–1258.
[8] François Chollet et al. 2015. Keras. https://keras.io.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Shahroz Tariq, Sangyup Lee and Simon S. Woo
[9] Davide Cozzolino, Giovanni Poggi, and Luisa Verdoliva. 2017. Recasting residual-
based local descriptors as convolutional neural networks: an application to image
forgery detection. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Information Hiding
and Multimedia Security. ACM, 159–164.
[10] Davide Cozzolino, Justus Thies, Andreas Rössler, Christian Riess, Matthias
Nießner, and Luisa Verdoliva. 2018. Forensictransfer: Weakly-supervised domain
adaptation for forgery detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.02510 (2018).
[11] Adrian Croft. 2019. From Porn to Scams, Deepfakes Are Becom-
ing a Big Racket-And That’s Unnerving Business Leaders and Lawmak-
ers. https://fortune.com/2019/10/07/porn-to-scams-deepfakes-big-racket-
unnerving-business-leaders-and-lawmakers. Accessed: 2020-02-11.
[12] Jia Deng,Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. 2009. Imagenet:
A large-scale hierarchical image database. In 2009 IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. Ieee, 248–255.
[13] EJ Dickson. 2019. Deepfake Porn Is Still a Threat, Particularly for K-
Pop Stars. https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/deepfakes-
nonconsensual-porn-study-kpop-895605. Accessed: 2020-02-11.
[14] Charlotte Edwards. 2019. Making deepfake porn could soon be as easy as using
Instagram filters, according to expert. https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/9800017/
deepfake-porn-soon-easy. Accessed: 2020-02-11.
[15] FaceSwapDevs. [n.d.]. Deepfakes_faceswap - GitHub Repository. https://github.
com/deepfakes/faceswap. Accessed: 2019-11-05.
[16] Pasquale Ferrara, Tiziano Bianchi, Alessia De Rosa, and Alessandro Piva. 2012.
Image forgery localization via fine-grained analysis of CFA artifacts. IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Forensics and Security 7, 5 (2012), 1566–1577.
[17] Alex Graves. 2013. Generating sequences with recurrent neural networks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1308.0850 (2013).
[18] David Güera and Edward J Delp. 2018. Deepfake video detection using recurrent
neural networks. In 2018 15th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Video
and Signal Based Surveillance (AVSS). IEEE, 1–6.
[19] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep residual
learning for image recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. 770–778.
[20] Minyoung Huh, Andrew Liu, Andrew Owens, and Alexei A Efros. 2018. Fighting
fake news: Image splice detection via learned self-consistency. In Proceedings of
the European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). 101–117.
[21] Hyeonseong Jeon, Youngoh Bang, and Simon S Woo. 2019. FakeTalkerDetect:
Effective and Practical Realistic Neural Talking Head Detection with a Highly Un-
balanced Dataset. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer
Vision Workshops. 0–0.
[22] Hyeonseong Jeon, Youngoh Bang, and Simon S Woo. 2020. FDFtNet: Facing
Off Fake Images using Fake Detection Fine-tuning Network. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2001.01265 (2020).
[23] Michael Kan. 2019. Most AI-Generated Deepfake Videos Online Are
Porn. https://www.pcmag.com/news/371193/most-ai-generated-deepfake-
videos-online-are-porn. Accessed: 2020-02-11.
[24] Tero Karras, Timo Aila, Samuli Laine, and Jaakko Lehtinen. 2017. Progressive
growing of gans for improved quality, stability, and variation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.10196 (2017).
[25] Marek Kowalski. 2016. FaceSwap - GitHub Repository. https://github.com/
MarekKowalski/FaceSwap. Accessed: 2020-02-12.
[26] Yuezun Li, Ming-Ching Chang, and Siwei Lyu. 2018. In ictu oculi: Exposing ai
created fake videos by detecting eye blinking. In 2018 IEEE International Workshop
on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS). IEEE, 1–7.
[27] Yaqi Liu, Qingxiao Guan, Xianfeng Zhao, and Yun Cao. 2018. Image forgery
localization based on multi-scale convolutional neural networks. In Proceedings
of the 6th ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security. ACM,
85–90.
[28] Falko Matern, Christian Riess, and Marc Stamminger. 2019. Exploiting visual
artifacts to expose deepfakes and face manipulations. In 2019 IEEE Winter Appli-
cations of Computer Vision Workshops (WACVW). IEEE, 83–92.
[29] Ghazal Mazaheri, Niluthpol Chowdhury Mithun, Jawadul H Bappy, and Amit K
Roy-Chowdhury. 2019. A Skip Connection Architecture for Localization of Image
Manipulations. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition Workshops. 119–129.
[30] Ivan Mehta. 2019. A new study says nearly 96 of deepfake videos are
porn. https://thenextweb.com/apps/2019/10/07/a-new-study-says-nearly-96-of-
deepfake-videos-are-porn. Accessed: 2020-02-11.
[31] Taesung Park, Ming-Yu Liu, Ting-Chun Wang, and Jun-Yan Zhu. 2019. Semantic
image synthesis with spatially-adaptive normalization. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 2337–2346.
[32] Adam Paszke, Sam Gross, Soumith Chintala, Gregory Chanan, Edward Yang,
Zachary DeVito, Zeming Lin, Alban Desmaison, Luca Antiga, and Adam Lerer.
2017. Automatic Differentiation in PyTorch. In NIPS Autodiff Workshop.
[33] Yuan Rao and Jiangqun Ni. 2016. A deep learning approach to detection of
splicing and copy-move forgeries in images. In 2016 IEEE International Workshop
on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS). IEEE, 1–6.
[34] Andreas Rössler, Davide Cozzolino, Luisa Verdoliva, Christian Riess, Justus Thies,
and Matthias Nießner. 2018. Faceforensics: A large-scale video dataset for forgery
detection in human faces. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.09179 (2018).
[35] Andreas Rössler, Davide Cozzolino, Luisa Verdoliva, Christian Riess, Justus Thies,
and Matthias Nießner. 2019. FaceForensics++: Learning to Detect Manipulated
Facial Images. In ICCV 2019.
[36] Ekraam Sabir, Jiaxin Cheng, Ayush Jaiswal, Wael AbdAlmageed, Iacopo Masi, and
Prem Natarajan. 2019. Recurrent Convolutional Strategies for Face Manipulation
Detection in Videos. Interfaces (GUI) 3 (2019), 1.
[37] Ronald Salloum, Yuzhuo Ren, and C-C Jay Kuo. 2018. Image splicing localiza-
tion using a multi-task fully convolutional network (MFCN). Journal of Visual
Communication and Image Representation 51 (2018), 201–209.
[38] Shahroz Tariq, Sangyup Lee, Hoyoung Kim, Youjin Shin, and Simon S Woo. 2018.
Detecting both machine and human created fake face images in the wild. In
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Multimedia Privacy and Security.
ACM, 81–87.
[39] Shahroz Tariq, Sangyup Lee, Hoyoung Kim, Youjin Shin, and Simon S Woo. 2019.
GAN is a friend or foe?: a framework to detect various fake face images. In
Proceedings of the 34th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing. ACM,
1296–1303.
[40] Justus Thies, Michael Zollhöfer, andMatthias Nießner. 2019. Deferred Neural Ren-
dering: Image Synthesis using Neural Textures. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.12356
(2019).
[41] Justus Thies, Michael Zollhöfer, Marc Stamminger, Christian Theobalt, and
Matthias Nießner. 2018. Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of
RGB Videos. Commun. ACM 62, 1 (Dec. 2018), 96–104. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3292039
[42] Alexandre Xavier. 2019. An introduction to ConvLSTM. https://medium.com/
neuronio/an-introduction-to-convlstm-55c9025563a7 Accessed: 2019-11-05.
[43] Shi Xingjian, Zhourong Chen, Hao Wang, Dit-Yan Yeung, Wai-Kin Wong, and
Wang-chun Woo. 2015. Convolutional LSTM network: A machine learning ap-
proach for precipitation nowcasting. In Advances in neural information processing
systems. 802–810.
[44] Xin Yang, Yuezun Li, and Siwei Lyu. 2019. Exposing deep fakes using inconsistent
head poses. In ICASSP 2019-2019 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing (ICASSP). IEEE, 8261–8265.
[45] Ido Yerushalmy and Hagit Hel-Or. 2011. Digital image forgery detection based on
lens and sensor aberration. International journal of computer vision 92, 1 (2011),
71–91.
[46] Kaipeng Zhang, Zhanpeng Zhang, Zhifeng Li, and Yu Qiao. 2016. Joint face
detection and alignment using multitask cascaded convolutional networks. IEEE
Signal Processing Letters 23, 10 (2016), 1499–1503.
[47] Peng Zhou, Xintong Han, Vlad I Morariu, and Larry S Davis. 2018. Learning rich
features for image manipulation detection. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 1053–1061.
A Convolutional LSTM based Residual Network for Deepfake Video Detection Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
A APPENDIX ON REPRODUCIBILITY
This section describes all the necessary information required to
reproduce the results from the experiments for CLRNet and all
baselines methods. Here, we tried our best to cover everything to
aid in reproducibility.
A.1 Hardware and software Configuration
We used Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4114 CPU@ 2.20GHz with 256.0GB
RAM and NVIDIA GeForce Titan RTX. The following package
versions were used on Python v3.7.5: TensorFlow-gpu: v1.13.1;
Keras-applications: v1.0.8; Keras-preprocessing: v1.1.0; cudatoolkit:
v10.0.130; numpy: v1.17.4; Pandas: v0.25.3; Opencv: 3.4.2; scikit-
learn: v0.21.3; PyTorch: v1.1.0.
A.2 Deepfake Video Dataset
We downloaded the dataset (DeepFake, Face2Face, FaceSwap, Neu-
ralTextures, and DeepFakeDetection) from the FaceForensics++
GitHub repository1 for the training and evaluation of the baseline
and our CLRNet model.
A.3 Implementation of CLRNet
We implemented our CLRNet model using TensorFlow and Keras
on Python. All the layers used in the model are available in the
Keras library. A detailed view of CLRNet architecture is provided
in Table 6. We used the Keras convention to name the layers. The
input shape for our model is (Videos, Samples, Rows, Columns,
Channels). The ImageDataGenerator in Keras can load data of the
form (Samples, Rows, Columns, Channels). Therefore, we could not
use the ImageDataGenerator provided by the Keras library. So we
built our own VideoDataGenerator with very similar functionality
as that of ImageDataGenerator. However, as we planned to provide
the input in a set of 5 consecutive frames, we had to implement
some extra features as well. All of this is present in our source code,
which we plan to release along with this paper.
A.4 Baseline Model Implementation
We compared our CLRNet model with five baseline models (Xcep-
tion, ShallowNet, FF++, DenseNet with Bidirectional RNN, and FT).
Below, we explain how these baselines are implemented.
A.4.1 Xception. We used the Keras implementation of Xception,
which is pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset.
A.4.2 ShallowNet. We implemented ShallowNetV3 based on the
specification provided by Tariq et al. [38] The architecture of Shal-
lowNetV3 is shown in Table 4. ShallowNetV3 consists of 4 blocks
with 33 layers. One row in Table 4 correspond to one block. We
implemented this architecture using Keras and TensorFlow as back-
end.
A.4.3 ForensicTransfer (FT).. We implemented ShallowNetV3 based
on the specification provided by Cozzolino et al. [10] The architec-
ture of the ForensicsTransfer (FT) model is shown in Table 5. We
implemented the FT model using PyTorch v.1.2.0. We tried our best
to mimic the original performance of the baseline.
1https://github.com/ondyari/FaceForensics
A.5 Data preparation for CLRNet
For dataset preparation, we randomly extracted 5 consecutive frames
from each video and used them as one sample. We extracted 16 sam-
ples from each video. The video whose frames are used in training
has not been used for validation or testing. We cropped the faces
from the frames using MTCNN [46]. We used our VideoDataGen-
erator to load these samples and feed them to CLRNet.
A.6 Data Augumentation
In Keras, the data augmentation feature can be used with the Image-
DataGenerator. As we have implemented the VideoDataGenerator,
we had to implement our own DataAugumentor as well. Therefore
we used the Keras ImageDataGenerator Interface and extended it to
VideoDataGenerator. The transformation setting we used for data
augmentation are as follows: rotation_range=30; brightness_range
= [0.7,1.0]; channel_shift_range=50.0; zoom_range=0.2; horizon-
tal_flip=True; fill_mode=‘nearest’.
A.7 Training of Models
We used the Adam optimizer with the following setting: lr = 0.00005;
beta_1 = 0.9; beta_2 = 0.999; epsilon = None; decay = 0.0; amsgrad
= False. For the loss function, we used the Binary Cross-entropy.
For every experiment, we trained our CLRNet and baseline models
for 100 epochs. The best epoch based on the validation loss is used
for evaluation with test datasets. We kept the same number of real
and fake samples in training, validation, and test datasets. For the
training of baseline methods, we used the same training and testing
methods as specified in their original paper.
A.8 Transfer Learning
We freeze the first 120 layers of our CLRNet model during transfer
learning. There is a small problem in Keras regarding the batch
normalization layer when it comes to transfer learning. We solved
this problem by using the solution provided by Vasilis Vryniotis2
and Oleg Gusev3. For transfer learning, we used 150 epochs for
each experiment, while keeping all other conditions the same. The
number of datasets used to transfer a specific target is ten videos,
and if there are two targets, ten videos from each target are used.
A.9 Source Code
We plan to release the source code for the implementations of
CLRNet, our experiments, and ShallowNet and ForensicsTransfer
(FT). If our paper gets accepted, we will clean up the code and share
it our GitHub. The source code also contains Juypter Notebooks of
all the experiments along with their results.
2http://blog.datumbox.com/the-batch-normalization-layer-of-keras-is-broken/
3https://github.com/keras-team/keras/pull/9965#issuecomment-549064001
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Shahroz Tariq, Sangyup Lee and Simon S. Woo
Table 4: ShallowNet Architecture. We used the following ShallowNetV3 architecture to develop this baseline model. Each row
represents a block in the architecture. An L2 kernel regularizer of 0.0001 is used in each Conv2D layer.
ShallowNetV3
Conv2D – ReLU – Dropout – Conv2D – ReLU – Dropout – Conv2D – ReLU – MaxPooling – Dropout
Conv2D – ReLU – Dropout – Conv2D – ReLU – Dropout – Conv2D – ReLU – MaxPooling – Dropout
Conv2D – ReLU – Dropout – Conv2D – ReLU – Dropout
Flatten – Dense – ReLU – BatchNormalization – Dropout – Dense – Sigmoid
Table 5: ForensicsTransfer (FT) Architecture. We used the following architecture to develop the FT baseline model. Each
Conv2d inside the Encoder part has a stride of 2, whereas each Conv2d in the Decoder part has a stride of 1. We used up-
sampling before each Conv2d layer inside the Decoder.
ForensicsTransfer (FT)
Encoder Conv2d – ReLU – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d – ReLU – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d – ReLU – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d– ReLU – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d – LReLU
Decoder Upsample – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d – ReLU – Upsample – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d – ReLU – Upsample – Conv2d– BatchNorm2d – ReLU – Upsample – Conv2d – BatchNorm2d – ReLU – ConvTranspose2d – Tanh
Table 6: This is the detailed architecture of the CLRNet model that we used in this paper. All of these layers are available in
the Keras library. The input size of the image is 240x240.
Convolutional LSTM based Residual Network (CLRNet)
ConvLSTM2D – BatchNorm – ReLU – MaxPooling3D
ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm
– ConvLSTM2D – ReLU – BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – ReLU – BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – ReLU – BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – ReLU – BatchNorm – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout – BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Dropout
– BatchNorm – ReLU – ConvLSTM2D – Add
BatchNorm – GlobalAveragePooling3D – Dropout – Dense
